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Abstract

1 Introduction

The view of language as action is wellentrenched in computational theories of discourse, however previous work has not paid
particular attention to the fact that agents'
resource bounds must a ect the way that dialogue proceeds just as it a ects agents' behavior in general. This paper presents results on the role of discourse strategies in improving performance on collaborative tasks
when agents are resource-limited. The resource limitation addressed here is limits in
inferential capacity, and the interaction of
discourse strategies with this limitation is
explored through a dialogue simulation environment, Design-World, in which inferential capacity can be parameterized. The
results reported here demonstrate that discourse strategies that incorporate redundant
information can improve the performance of
inference-limited agents to the point of logical omniscience.

The view of language as action is wellentrenched in computational theories of discourse, however previous work has not paid
particular attention to the fact that agents'
resource bounds must a ect the way that dialogue proceeds just as it a ects agents' behavior in general. This paper focuses on the
relation of agents' resource bounds to a particular discourse phenomenon,
utterances (IRUs), de ned
below:
is
in a discourse situation S if u expresses a proposition
p , and p is already entailed in S .

An utterance

ui

i

i

i

is a paradox
according to the language as action view; it
appears that agents are performing actions
whose e ects have already been achieved.
Yet IRUs account for approximately 12% of
the utterances in a large corpus of naturally occurring multi-agent problem-solving
dialogues[22, 18]. Examples of IRUs and some
results from a distributional analysis of the
corpus will be discussed further in section 1.1.
I argue elsewhere that IRUs are not communicatively redundant, and serve three communicative functions[21]:

The gures in this postworkshop version of the
AAAI Reasoning about Mental States workshop paper
are modi ed so that the simulation comparison results
are plotted as di erences, rather than requiring the
reader to visually make the comparison, in response
to a suggestion from Mark Liberman. Other than
this minor change, this paper is identical to the one
presented at the workshop. Thanks to Aravind Joshi
for funding this work under ARO grant DAAL03-89C0031PRI and DARPA grant N00014-90-J-1863 at the
University of Pennsylvania, and to Hewlett Packard,
U.K., and to an NSF award for 1991 Science and Engineering Institute in Japan
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 Attitude: to address the assumptions un-

derlying the inference of mutual understanding and acceptance

1

 Consequence: to augment the evidence

tecture. Section 3 describes this parameterizable model of attention that simulates both
recency and frequency e ects[15]. The major
goal of the experiments is to test whether dialogue strategies that use IRUs are more ecient when agents have limited attention and
limited means-end reasoning. The dialogue
strategies will be discussed in section 5. Sections 5.1.1 and 5.2.1 describe the results of experiments to explore the interactions of IRUs
and resource-bounds.

supporting mutual beliefs that certain inferences are licensed, or to provide a context in which an inference is more easily
made
 Attention: to manipulate the locus of attention of the discourse participants by
making or keeping a proposition salient
Furthermore, each of these communicative
functions is related to a particular way in
which agents are resource-bounded.1 Attitude follows from agents' autonomy and the
resultant potential for costly misunderstandings and disagreements[9]. Consequence follows from the fact that agents are not logically omniscient[14, 13, 16]. Attention follows
from the fact that agents have limited attentional capacity[1]. This paper focuses on the
interaction of Consequence and Attention.
In order to explore the relationship of
resource-bounds and dialogue strategies that
incorporate IRUs, I have developed a computational simulation environment called
Design-World. The Design-World environment and task is presented in section 2. Like
Tileworld, Design-World is structured around
the IRMA agent architecture for resourcebounded agents[4, 19]. The Design-World
simulation replaces action in the environment,
with communicative acts that propose future
actions. The IRMA architecture supports the
separation of bounds on means-end reasoning and deliberation, which is necessary to
test the hypotheses about the communicative
functions of IRUs. Limited means-end reasoning is modeled by discrete Design-World
parameter settings constraining how many inferences are made.
Design World adds a model of limited attention to the belief module of the IRMA archi-

1.1

Examples of IRUs

A distributional analysis was performed on a
corpus of joint problem-solving dialogues from
a radio talk show for nancial advice[18].2
The utterance(s) that originally added the
propositional content of the IRU to the discourse situation is called the IRU's
. In the examples below, IRUs are
marked with CAPS whereas their antecedents
are given in italics.
An example of a Consequence IRU is given in
1.
(1)

(15) h. Oh no. I R A's were available

are not a participant in
an existing pension
as long as you

(16) j.

Oh I see.

Well I did work,

I do work for a company that has a
pension
(17) h. ahh. THEN YOU'RE NOT
ELIGIBLE FOR EIGHTY ONE

In example 1, (17) is inferrable via logical inference from (15) and (16) and yet the talk
show host Harry (h) makes this inference explicit. Consequence IRUs are related to the
fact that agents are not logically omniscient.
If agents make inferences explicit, this demon-

Individual IRUs may simultaneously address one
or more of these functions: if inferences are focused
on what is currently attended to, as seems likely[14],
then limits on inferencing follow directly from limits
on attention.
1

strates that they made a particular inference,

This consisted of a qualitative analysis of 471 IRUs
from 54 dialogues, and a quantitative analysis of 176
IRUs from 24 dialogues.
2

2

and also ensures that another agent can draw

a

that inference.

gested course of action is motivated by that

for the intended act, i.e. the sug-

fact.

Consequence IRUs also include cases where
agents restate premises that are already mu-

Example 3 demonstrates the communicative

tually believed so that inferences dependent

function of Attention.

on these premises are easily made. Consider

to set the context and ensure that agents are

example 2:

jointly attending to the same concepts[23].

IRUs are often used

Example 3-(22) consists of two clauses that
(2)

both realize propositions discussed earlier in

(42) h. Now what is your income situation?
(43) m.

We're both retired

3-(4) to (6).

and our

income for the year is about um 24..

(3)

( 3) e. ..... { and I was wondering {

about 26 thousand

should I continue on with the certi -

(44) h. Have you other securities than

cates or

stock? Have you any bonds or certi -

( 4) h.

cates?

cause we're so far away from any of

(45) m. Yes yes we do- we have some

them { but I would suggest this { if

Well it's dicult to tell be-

ally the extent of our uh

all
of these are 6 month certi cates and I
presume they are
( 5) e. yes
( 6) h. then I would like to see you
start spreading some of that money
around

(46) h. Ok - on the proceeds of that

( 7) e. uh hu

GM stock

( 8) h. Now in addition, how old are

(47) m. Yes

you?

(48) h.

.

certi cates oh about uh 15 - 20 thousand, not much, we're not rich - and
we have a house completely paid for,
have some land in the Poconos, completely paid for - and uh that's actu-

I'd like to see you put that

into two di erent southern utilities

(discussion about retirement invest-

.

ments)

(clari cation of southern utilities)

.

.

(21) e. uh huh and

(58) h. And those I think that you will

(22) h.

but as far as the certi -

cates are concerned, I'D LIKE THEM

nd that that will give you a good return,

SPREAD OUT A LITTLE BIT -

YOU ARE RETIRED

THEY'RE ALL 6 MONTH CER-

and that is primarily what you are

TIFICATES

looking for, in addition I think that

(23) e. yes

eventually those stocks will rise as well

(24) h. and I don't like putting all my

(59) m. uh huh

eggs in one basket.....
These Attention IRUs redirect the listener's

Beginning with (46) Harry (h) suggests a

attention to the previously discussed proposi-

course of action. In (58) he paraphrases to

tions. A hypothesis tested in the simulation is

Mary (m) a fact that she told him in (43),

that dialogues where one conversant produces

you are retired.

However Harry's statement

Attention IRUs, which function to recreate

in this context leads to the inference that the

the previous context, are more cost e ective

fact that Mary and her husband are retired is

than dialogues where agents are always made
3

to retrieve those propositions from memory.

Design-World task consists of two agents who

Note that the initial phrase of (22),

must carry out a dialogue in order to come to

far as the certi cates are concerned,

but as

should

an agreement on a design for a

oor plan with

be enough to direct the listener's attention to

two rooms. Each agent has di erent pieces of

that context, so that the IRUs in (22) could

furniture and there are more pieces available

conceivably have been retrieved from memory

than needed to accomplish the task. Furni-

based on the initial phrase alone.

ture items are of 5 types: couch, table, chair,
lamp and rug. Each furniture item has a color

SALIENT

DISPLACED

and point value. A design for a room consists

Repetitions

50

11

associated with a furniture item supports the

Paraphrases

32

28

the design plan. The agents attempt to max-

Inferences

24

8

sign. Figure 2 shows a potential initial state

of any four pieces from these types. The score
calculation of utility of including that item in
imize the score achieved together by their defor a dialogue.
Performance is measured by the score associ-

Figure 1: The distribution of IRUs with re-

ated with the

spect to the discourse status of their an-

the costs to achieve this score.

tecedent

Costs are

based on: (1) number of utterances in the dialogue; (2) the amount of means-end reasoning

A distributional analysis of the location of

required; and (3) the number of steps involved

IRUs with respect to the location of their antecedents is given in the table shown in
3.

nal design as compared with

in searching the representation of current be-

gure

liefs and intentions. This makes it possible to

The results show that logical inferences

explore in a principled manner the trade-o s

usually have salient antecedents (24 out of

associated with di erent dialogue strategies.

32). This fact provides weak support for the
hypothesis that limited inference is mainly determined by limited attention. This analysis
also shows that paraphrases are more likely
than the other types to have displaced antecedents, (28 out of 60). These paraphrases

ROOM # 1

are often examples similar to 2 where a fact
discussed earlier is used as a

for

AGENT A’s PIECES:

a course of action discussed later. The other

RED COUCH
30 pts.
BLUE TABLE
25 pts.
YELLOW COUCH 15pts.
BLUE CHAIR
15 pts.
RED RUG
20 pts
YELLOW LAMP
10 pts.

most common cases of remote paraphrases are
those that manipulate attention as in example 3.

These two kinds of cases are clearly

related: in both cases a fact discussed earlier

ROOM # 2
AGENT B’s PIECES:
BLUE COUCH
YELLOW CHAIR

20 pts.
15 pts.

YELLOW TABLE 15 pts
BLUE LAMP
20 pts.

in the dialogue is used later in reasoning.

Figure 2:

Potential Initial State for the

2

In Design-World, unlike Tileworld, the envi-

Design-World Task

Design World Simulation
Experiments

ronment consists of both the domain-based
task and the other agent. In the Design-World
task, the potential intended acts, ie. options,

The Design-World simulation environment

are domain level intended acts such as putting

consists of the

a particular furniture piece into a particular

oor plan for a house[24]. The

4

room.

These options may eventually corre-

rates the role of deliberation in planning fuis

spond to proposals that an agent makes to

ture actions[8]. A

another agent, depending on the outcome of

achieved by a cycle in which: (1) individual

the deliberation process. Messages from other

agents perform means-end reasoning about

agents create options for the receiver that

options in the domain; (2) individual agents

they didn't previously know about, which are

deliberate about which options are preferable;

then subject to deliberation.

(3) then agents make

to other

agents, based on the options identi ed in a

2.1

reasoning cycle, about actions that contribute

Domain and Plan Structure

to the satisfaction of their goals; (4) then
or

these proposals are

Each agent starts with private beliefs as to

by the other agent, or acceptance/rejection is

what pieces of furniture she has and what

for more information.

postponed by

colors these pieces are. Agents share beliefs

A schema for agents' messages is given in
ure 3.3

about which pieces of furniture exist and how
many points they are worth. These are represented with domain state predicates. The

g-

OPEN

only domain actions are:

KEY:
Speaker Change



(Put ?Agent ?Furniture ?Room ?Time)



(Remove

?Agent

?Furniture

Possibly NO Speaker Change

PROPOSE

May be IMPLICIT

?Room

?Time)

ASK
REJECT
PROPOSE

ACCEPT

Goals are to design a room and to match
the color of the furniture in a room whenever

SAY

doubles the

possible since a

points of the pieces involved. Agents are from
a set of two, Ann and Bob, as well as Ann and
Bob as a pair, A&B. The ?Time variable for
or

each action and state is either

CLOSE

.

In the Design-World simulation, the agents

Figure 3: Dialogue Actions for the Design-

share beliefs about what it means to have a

World Task:Version 1

to achieve a goal(See

The

also [23, 7, 12]):
A&B (Achieve A&B
Goal)

2.

are

()

1. MB A&B (Intend A

8 i

dia-

logues that agents engage in in Design-World
[23]. Both agents rea-

son about the domain and both agents have

_B

( 1

goals so either agent can make a

^ : : : n ))

(MB A&B (Contribute

Furthermore, even though agents are working together to perform the task, there is no

i (Achieve

These actions do not represent a claim that this is
how humans conceptualize dialogue or that problem
solving dialogues can be analyzed into structures exactly like these. See [5, 20] for alternate utterance taxonomies used in simulations. The hypothesis is that
the e ects of resource-bounds will operate independently of the range of utterance level intentions and
other strategies available to an agent.
3

A&B Goal))
3. MB A&B (Max-Utility ( 1
(Achieve A&B Goal))

^

:::

.

n)

The use of the Max-Utility constraint in the
formulation of collaborative planning incorpo5

guarantee that they will accept one another's

couch in the study

proposals. Each agent reasons about whether

KIM: Putting in the green lamp is

to accept or reject a proposal based on her

worth 55

view of the proposed action's utility and thus
there is no enforced collaboration [2].4 Ac-

KIM: No, instead let's put the green

ceptance generates the mutual beliefs neces-

BILL: Then, let's put the green couch

sary for the agents to have a

in the study

lamp in the study

, but acceptance can be done implicitly
or explicitly.5
As shown in

gure 3, a rejection always in-

B

cludes a counter-proposal. This simpli cation
is due to the fact that the decision to reject a

KEY:

proposal is based on comparing it with other

B = Blue

options an agent knows about, and another

B

20
20

15

Y

Y
10

R

15

R = Red

option must be of greater utility to support a

Y = Yellow

rejection. Although it is possible for an agent

R

30

to respond to a rejection with another rejection, all con icts are eventually resolved since

ROOM # 1

agents share a global utility function based on

15

Y

Y

15

ROOM # 2

the score associated with a particular intention. This is illustrated in the excerpt from a
sample dialogue in 4 below:6
(4)

DESIGN WORLD COLLABORATIVE PLAN : 280 points
Figure 4: Potential Final State for DesignWorld Task:

BILL: Let's put the green couch in the

Represents the Collaborative

Plan Achieved by the Dialogue, assuming

study

Matched-Pair goals

KIM: No, instead let's put the green
lamp in the study

The communicative strategies associated with

BILL: Putting in the green couch is

making and accepting or rejecting proposals

worth 54

and with acquiring and providing information

BILL: No, instead let's put the green

on which deliberation is based is discussed in

If B doesn't have enough information to make a
comparison between the options that B knows about
and the one that A has proposed, B may assume that
A's proposal isn't worth much or B may ask A for the
value of A's proposal. However, if B has no options
available to satisfy the same goal, B can accept A's
proposal without knowing its exact value.
5
Utterances that indicate acceptance explicitly are
most often Attitude IRUs. The account of Attitude
IRUs is that they address the assumptions underlying
the inference of mutual belief, which depends on the
evidence that the addressee provides as to the e ect of
an utterance[25, 23, 6]. When the underlying assumptions are supported by explicit evidence in the dialogue, the mutual beliefs that are dependent on them
are less defeasible(see also [11, 10]). This weak model
of mutual belief is is discussed elsewhere[22, 21].
6
Agents communicate with a propositional language. This dialogue gloss is generated automatically
using adhoc procedures from the propositional language that agents communicate with.
4

section 5.

Figure 4 shows a potential

nal

collaborative plan for the task as a result of
the dialogue, based on the initial state given
in

3

gure 2.

Limited
Memory/Attention Model

There is an abundant amount of evidence that
attention/working memory (AWM) capacity
is limited in human agents[17, 1, 3].

How-

ever, it is not at all clear what exactly these
limits are and how they interact with agents'
reasoning capabilities.
The AWM model used in Design World is a
6

very simple model that incorporates both re-

ter setting. In addition, when AWM is set to

cency and frequency e ects, and which has

11, the agents achieve optimal performance.

been shown to account for a broad range

This means that whenever a level of perfor-

of empirical results on human memory and

mance is desired, it can be guaranteed, but if

learning[15]. This model consists of a three di-

action is required at low levels of resources,

mensional space in which beliefs are stored in

some reasonable behavior is produced.

chronological sequence according to the cur-

The AWM/Score plot shown in

rent location of a moving memory pointer.

gure 5 is a

Baseline for ALL inference agents (Baseline-

The next memory pointer location is never

ALL) against which to compare Explicit Con-

more than two steps away from the current lo-

sequence and Explicit Attention strategies

cation. However, of the distance 2 locations,

discussed below.

the location to be used next is randomly selected. Thus beliefs acquired near the same
time will tend be closer together, and beliefs

4

stored in multiple locations have a greater

Limiting Consequence

chance of being retrieved.
Another parameter of the Design World simulation is a resource-bound on the number of

Bill Kim
500

inferences that agents may make. This is realized with 3 discrete settings: (1) agents store
NO inferences in memory; (2) agents store
k

400

HALF of the possible inferences; (3) agents
store ALL of the possible inferences.

k
k

Joe Jane (no Act Effect Inferences)
500

Scores

300

k

450

200

k

350

100

400

k

0

Scores

k

4

6

8

10

200

2

250

300

k

Baseline-ALL: Two ALL Infer-

100

ence, Consequence Implicit, Attention Im-

50

150

Memory

Figure 5:

plicit Agents, Averages of 100 runs

0

0

0

3

4

5

0

0

6

7

0

0

0

0

When items are to be retrieved from mem-

1

ory, search starts from the current memory

2

8

9

10

11

Memory

pointer location and spreads out in a spherical fashion. AWM is modeled as the radius

Figure 6: Baseline-NO: Two NO Inference,

of this search sphere. As shown in

Consequence Implicit and Attention Implicit

gure 5,

AWM alone provides a main e ect on scores
in the simulations.

Agents, Averages of 100 runs

The points plotted are
Figure 5 plots performance as a function of

stable averages of 100 runs at each parame7

5

AWM when both agents are ALL inference
agents, i.e.

logically omniscient.

Figure 6

shows the scores achieved by two agents who
store NO inferences.
shown in

Communication Strategies

An agent's communication strategy deter-

The AWM/Score plot

mines which discourse actions an agent has

gure 6 is a Baseline for NO infer-

available, and in particular whether they pro-

ence agents (Baseline-NO) against which the

duce IRUs in certain discourse situations.

Explicit Consequence and Explicit Attention

The hypotheses about the bene ts of IRUs

strategies will be compared. The low scores

are tested by comparing the performance of

of these NO inference agents are one result

agents that systematically produce IRUs in

of the large number of invalid steps in their

certain discourse situations as compared with

plans because they don't infer that once they

agents that don't. The communicative strate-

have used a piece of furniture in a plan step,

gies associated with the Consequence and At-

they no longer have it.

tention IRU classes are discussed below.

John Jill (John 1/2, Jill 1/2 Act Effect Inferences)
500

5.1

450

There are two Explicit Attention strategies:

.5

350

400

Open-All and Open-Best.

These are to be

compared with an agent using the Baseline

.5

strategy shown in

.5

gure 5 who makes no ut-

300

terances that explicitly indicate attentional
state.

250

.5

200
150

Open and Close statements for the simulation

.5

100

Both the Open-All and Open-Best

strategies explicitly indicate the opening and
closing of a segment of the dialogue.7 Basic

.5

are given below:

.5

50

(Say A B
(Open (Achieve A&B (Design Room-1))))

.5

0

Scores

Attention Strategies

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

(Say A B

11

(Close (Achieve A&B (Design Room-1))))

Memory

The Open-All strategy consists of the Ba-

Figure 7: Two HALF Inference Agents, Con-

sic Open plus additional statements in which

sequence and Attention Implicit

the agent communicates every single fact he
thinks of, as he reasons about the current in-

Figure 7 shows the scores achieved by two

tention.

agents who each make HALF of the possi-

This is shown in example 5.

The

IRUs are given in CAPS:

ble inferences. Surprisingly, these two HALF
inference agents do not perform signi cantly

(5)

worse than the Baseline-ALL agents shown in

.
.

gure 5.

Bill: Now, let's put something in the

The next section introduces the communica-

living room.

tion strategies that interact with these basic

Bill: BILL HAS THE GREEN RUG

resource bounds. Section 5.1.1 and 5.2.1 will

Segments are task-de ned as the utterances
needed for reasoning and discussion about one
intention.
7

describe the results of experiments exploring
these interactions.

8

Bill:

BILL

HAS

THE

GREEN

Comparing open-best-kim to bill-kim
100

COUCH
Bill: BILL HAS THE RED COUCH
Bill: BILL HAS THE RED LAMP
Bill:

BILL

HAS

THE

GREEN
50

CHAIR

Bill: Let's put the green rug in the
study.
.

.

.

.

.

0

Bill: BILL HAS THE RED TABLE

Score DIFFERENCES

Bill: BILL HAS THE RED CHAIR

.

.

.

1

2

3

.

.
.

.

.
.

.

.

.

..

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

-50

.
The Open-Best strategy consists of the Open
statement above, plus two additional state-100

ments in which the agent communicates the
facts used in reasoning about the two best options she has identi ed. See example 6:
(6)

ATTENTION/WORKING MEMORY

Kim: Now, let's put something in the

Figure 8: Two ALL Inference Agents, One is

study

Open-Best

Kim: KIM HAS THE BLUE CHAIR
Kim: KIM HAS THE BROWN TA-

As shown in

BLE

gure 9, the Open-All strategy

also does better than the Baseline strategy.

Kim: Then, let's put the brown table
in the study

100

Comparing op3-kim-100 to bill-kim-100

This strategy is common in the human-human
dialogues for this type of task, where the
rst[24]. The following section dis-

5.1.1 Results for Attention
9 are plots of the

di erences

gures 8 and

.

.

.
.

.

.

.

0

1

2

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

..

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

-50

The AWM/Score plots shown in

.
.
.

0

cusses the results of using these strategies.

Score DIFFERENCES

ing pieces

50

agents concentrate on using the highest scor-

between the

Open-Best and the Open-All strategies and
gure 5. At
-100

the Baseline strategy shown in

AWM values of 1 to 4, Open-Best is a better
strategy than Baseline. However there is an
AWM/Strategy interaction and with AWM at

ATTENTION/WORKING MEMORY

5, Baseline does better. The hypothesized explanation for this fact is that IRUs can dis-

Figure 9: Two ALL Inference Agents, One is

place facts from memory that might have con-

Open-All

tributed more to performance.
9

However, there is no signi cant di erence be-

with furniture items at the beginning of the

tween the Open-All and the Open-Best strate-

task.

gies.

5.2

5.2.1 Results for Consequence

Consequence Strategies

First, CI was tested with inference ALL
A second set of simulations tests two di er-

agents. A hypothesis was that even though

ent Consequence strategies against the Base-

inference ALL agents would de nitely have

line. Remember that the Baseline is an im-

inferred the additional fact included in the

plicit Consequence strategy, i.e. no IRUs re-

CI strategy, increasing the frequency of this

lated to Consequence are communicated; the
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